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Abstract 
Although the classical economic theory postulates that individuals should make perfectly rational choices that take into account 
all the available information, I will present, in the following, the action of behavioral factors on the decisions regarding the 
insurance against certain events. I will analyze the elements that determine a person who should be covered against a risk, not to 
buy insurance and the reverse situation when, although the likelihood of the event is reduced, a person will secure against the 
damage(s) caused by it. In this paper I developed a general approach of the behavioral factors with specific reference to the 
Romanian market .Finally, I will suggest the insurance companies, as well as the market regulator in Romania ,different client 
approaches and specific protection taking into account customers' behavioral issues and financial awareness in the field. 
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Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Faculty of Economic Sciences, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu. 
Keywords: insurance; behavioral; decision. 
1. Introduction 
According to the conventional economic theory, humans have the ability to process information, to act guided by 
self-interest and to try from their actions to maximize their wealth or income. 
Multiple researches in behavioral economics show that people do not always have the ability to make fully 
rational decisions as assumed in the classical economic theory. Most people do not take appropriate action to 
maximize their revenues and rigorously calculate the cost versus benefits, do not operate with perfect information 
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nor do them accurately analyze future effects of current decisions. According to the followers of behavioral 
-138) with 
the decision taken - take the best decision possible with the best possible results in terms of psychological and social 
environment in which they operate. 
While conventional behavior is considered to be rational, behavioral economics refers to how people behave 
1957). Operating often with limited rationality - I mean the 
limitation of information and time, at their processing capacity - people use certain models and patterns in decision 
making. Some economists consider these models as error-prone, others believe that these models generate superior 
results given the limitations of a human been. 
To analyze a simple but suggestive example, it should be considered the situation when, while somebody is 
crossing the street, a car is moving at a high speed towards him/her. At that point a decision must be made. Taking 
into consideration the classical theory of total rationality he/she should calculate the probability that the car would 
stop and depending on the result, take the optimal decision - jump in front of the car or quietly continue our 
crossing. On the other hand  as I think it happens in practice - applying a decision-making model this person will 
quickly cross the street without having to calculate a certain probability of being hit by the rushed driver. 
Decision-making patterns are often influenced by a series of psychological and social factors as: adversity against 
loss, emotions, biases, social norms, culture and history. 
In this paper I will study the influence of these factors in the process of decision making regarding the action of 
buying insurance or not. It goes without saying that no one will accept the negative consequences (monetary and 
others) of an unwanted incident, but still some people have insurance and others do not. Do insurance companies 
take into account the influence of these factors on buyer decision when they launch a commercial offer? Does the 
training of insurance agents must include psychological aspects to make their mission easier? 
In conclusion I will answer these questions taking into account behavioral influences and relying on the results of 
studies conducted in developed insurance markets. 
2. Insurance Decision 
Insurance affects individuals and businesses, in a financial way, before the specific covered events occur due to 
the fact that the insurer must collect the prime. Compensation is paid when the insured event covered by the policy 
occurs. Thus, in a classical approach, an insurance decision is induced by the interest to ensure against an event and 
the financial affordability of the insurance. 
Empirical evidences suggest that many people who could benefit from insurance are not covered. For example, 
even if the risk is obvious, flood insurance is not purchased by homeowners until they suffer damages from a 
disaster. In Romania, insurance policies against disaster (PAD) began to be interesting as a result of their regulation 
by Law No. 260/2008 republished in 2011 that establishes a legal obligation, both for individuals and firms, to 
conclude such a policy. After the rise of mandatory household insurance in 2011, in 2012 they declined 
significantly. Thus, at the end of July 2012, there were approximately 248,000 valid insurance policies PAD, more 
than three times less the maximum of August 2011 (about 820,000). 
Regarding the behavioral aspect highlighted by the Romanian saying: "Where's law, do not bargain
observe a decrease  after passing the tip of compulsoriness - July 2011, the 
month in which was recorded the highest number of policies sold in a single day (28,771 policies sold in July 14) 
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Fig. 1. Evolution of Active PAD Policies Number 2010-2012 and the Monthly Average Sold Policies; 
Source: http://www.paidromania.ro/statistici 
Trying to boost the compulsory insurance market, in August 2012 the Insurance Supervisory Commission, by 
order 15, Article 7, paragraph 2, considers that: "Starting from 09.01.2012, insurance companies authorized to sell 
optional insurance for homes will be able to sell such home insurance for risks subject to mandatory home insurance 
contract, only for the insured amounts which exceed the insured amounts required under Law no. 260/2008, 
republished ". The Commission failed in this action, creating even more confusion on the market both on that of 
insurance and also on the adjacent ones (e.g. the real estate collateral for bank whose loans were secured by 
insurance policies for long periods of time), so that the article above is repealed by Order 21/2012 issued in 
November 2012. 
Although one is tempted to believe that the decrease of the number of PAD active policies was determined by a 
preference for the voluntary policy, with coverage of a wider range of risks and higher insured amounts, Chart 2 
demonstrates a decrease in 2012 of the entire number of home insurance policies (mandatory and voluntary). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Evolution of Home Insurance Policies Number (mandatory and voluntary) 
  Source : http://www.csa-isc.ro, buletin informativ 3/2012 
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Returning to the mandatory policies ended in 2011, there is a much stronger risk perception in the areas heavily 
affected by floods in 2010 (Moldova, Dobrogea) and 2011 (Muntenia and Transylvania). Thus, these areas held on 
December 31st, 2011 the following percentages of the total underwritten policies: 25.4% Muntenia, 18.8% 
Moldova, 9.6% Transylvania and 9.1% Dobrogea - Chart no. 3.  
I believe that the decrease of the number of policies is due to the fact that the year 2012 was a dry year, 
decreasing the perception of flood hazard and leading the owners of the houses not to renew the policies that they 
bought in 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Regional Distribution of PAD Policies at 31st December 2011 
Source : https://www.paidromania.ro/statistics 
The effective measures taken in order to prevent the insured event by the insured person could lead to a reduction 
of the insurance premium if the insurer might assess them at a low cost. For example, if a homeowner with a 
property insurance for earthquake risk invests in measures to limit the losses caused by the insured event and if this 
investment can be assessed by the insurer, in fact a competitive insurer who has the freedom to differentiate the 
premium according to the risk, has a financial incentive to reach a lower insurance premium than the premium 
charged for earthquake in case of no measures to reduce losses were taken. The benefit as smaller expected losses 
has to be large enough so that the insurer could bear the costs due to variations of the insurance premiums 
 
It is also difficult to know how these policies are presented by the insurance agents. Some people who apparently 
do not need protection against a specified risk still buy the insurance that covers that risk.  
There are situations when some uninsured property owners may not have a high risk aversion while some buyers 
of electrical products and appliances, concerned with the protection of these devices can choose insurance with a 
high price (premium).In fact many people make unexpected choices, other than acting rationally or be better 
informed. One or both of the efficient market conditions may be absent. 
 According to the classical economic theory and principles of efficient market, consumers have unrestricted 
access to information, have processing capacity, the risk is clearly perceived and each individual chooses "the 
amount of insurance" that maximizes his expected utility. As long as people are risk averse, they are willing to pay a 
premium greater than or equal to the expected value of losses caused by certain events which are covered by the 
insurance. The maximum amount that an individual is willing to pay to cover an insured event depends on its level 
of risk aversion. 
In the following I develop the reasons why actual behavior of insurance buyer may differ from that described by 
classical theory. First, those for who the insurance is an attractive financial investment may be undecided or unable 
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to collect the information required for the decision due to lack of time, effort and cost associated with this process. 
In addition people might not be able to process information in a classical assumed way. Some examples of wrong 
information processing due to behavior would be: risk misperception (underestimation of risk), the use of simplified 
rules for decision making and hesitation in choosing new alternatives (e.g. bias).  
People can also have financial constraints or other which may affect them leading to a different behavior than in 
the classical theory.  
Another behavioral aspect not taken into account in the classical theory is the preference which may occur due to 
emotions, regrets or disapprovals regarding certain characteristics of an insurance. 
2.1 Risk Perception 
Most of the insurance are related to events with a low probability of incidence which by definition does not 
correspond to human experience. Therefore there may be misperceptions of risk by different people, which leads to 
a wrong choice of insurance or avoidance of buying one. Eisner and Strotz in 1961 argued that people pay more for 
flying insurance than they should. In 1978 H.Kunreuther demonstrated that people do not buy flood insurance even 
if they are subsidized and the insurance premiums are well below actuarial calculations. 
Public perception about the frequency and likelihood of a risk can be manipulated. A number of studies 
conducted by Lichtenstein in 1978 in the U.S. where people were asked to estimate the  causes of death frequency 
have revealed an overestimation of the causes that have killed many people in a single occurrence and an 
underestimation of others. 
Combs and Slovic in 1979 show that these biases in risk perception are highly correlated with the media 
presentation of the events that generate damage. A person who perceives risk to be higher than those scientific 
estimated will be determined to buy a more comprehensive insurance. Recognizing that people perception is not 
rational, is not perfect and can be manipulated could be the basis for new regulations in the field and prohibit certain 
practices in selling insurance. 
2.2. Biases 
There are plenty of empirical evidences according to which individuals are reluctant to get rid of certain biases 
even when it is obvious that the benefits would be much higher (Samuleson, Zechauser, 1988). One explanation for 
this could be risk aversion: pain intensity associated with a possible loss caused by behavior is greater than the 
amount of happiness that would be experienced in an equivalent gain (Tversky, Kahneman, 1991). 
There is also empirical evidence from laboratory studies that individuals make decisions mostly comparing the 
changes in their financial status due to specific actions rather than determining the impact these actions have on the 
final welfare according to utility theory. Several studies have shown that individuals are willing to risk when we are 
talking about losses and reluctant when we refer to earnings. (Tversky, Kahneman, 1979). 
Introducing the function of the value  will make insurance less attractive than the function of utility because the 
insurance decision involves comparability in terms of loss, an area where people are more willing to accept the risk. 
If individuals do not see a greater risk of incidence of the event insured than the insurer, there is no economic 
incentive to buy insurance.  
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Fig. 4. Value Function 
  
Several researches showed that an increase in the likelihood of loss is considered to be of greater interest than a 
lower probability of loss in motivating protective behavioral changes. 
 
 An example of this effect was emphasized by the study led by Kip Viscusi in 1987. Respondents in a shop were 
shown a container with insecticide telling them that the risk of injury rate is 15 - to 10,000 containers sold. The 
average willingness to pay to eliminate the risk was 3.78 USD. Asked about the price reduction that they would 
require if the risk increased by 1/10.000, over 75% of respondents indicated that they would refuse to buy the 
product regardless of price. 
2.3. Models of Decision Making 
There are many things a person should consider in his daily activities. Given the limited time and processing 
capacity of the human brain, it is not irrational for individuals to use certain patterns of decision making. Herbert 
Simon (Nobel Prize in economics) considers the processing capacity of the human brain as a scarce resource - 
people have limitations both in processing information in a certain period of time and in the quality of the 
processing. Information processing involves time and energy that are limited for everyone. Given these constraints, 
people make decisions which they consider well enough considering the limitation they had to face. 
The adverse events, that are associated with the decision to purchase insurance, are prime candidates for this 
treatment because they are unpleasant things that you should consider. Some people use thought patterns where 
events with a small chance of occurrence are ignored. 
Kunreuther and Pauly (2006) say that if the perceived probability (p) in case of an event that involves some loss 
(P) is below a critical level set (p'), then the person will assume that "nothing seriously will happen to me ". 
Behavior can be restored in a simple model of decision making in the event of a perceived loss (P): 
a) If  p' then it is assumed that p = 0; 
b) If p> p' then it is considered p' as the perceived probability of the occurrence of an event. 
Loss Gain 
Value (+) 
Value (-) 
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2.4. "Mental Accounts" 
Another reason why some people refuse to buy insurance is a perception related to constraints of income or cash 
flows available in the future and the lack of funds available to invest in the protection against some events with a 
low probability.  
Of course, if the protected asset is a financial one it will be an irrational response "I can not afford insurance" that 
would protect against the loss of the asset. If I cannot afford insurance means that I do not "allow" the asset 
maintenance in the current form or at the current value. It would be more rational to sacrifice a part of the asset to 
pay for insurance than to take the risk of losing the entire active. 
If the asset is not liquid (e.g. a building), the phenomenon of "insupportability" insurance premium is particularly 
true when the asset is more than a part of the personal property. For example, a house occupied by the owner creates 
utility of consumption since the entire family enjoys living in the house every day. If the owner has bought several 
properties for investment purposes would not be reasonable to make such a big investment, in case he could not 
afford to buy insurance for them.  
Another reason why people should not buy insurance is that people plan their expenses and organize them in 
"mental accounts" adding constraints on the amounts that will be spent on a particular service or category of goods 
(Thaler, 1985). If we consider "mental account" named "security and welfare expenses" and we take into account the 
premiums paid for car insurance, pension, health we might no longer be willing to sign also insurance for natural 
disasters or to conclude it for a reduced number of covered risks. 
The idea of borrowing money today to increase the budget for buying insurance that will reduce tomorrow losses 
I think it is not a part of the mindset for many consumers. 
2.5. The Influence of Emotions  
Bell, 1982 Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Braun and Muermann, 2004), disappointment and euphoria (David Bell, 
1985). 
If we consider the two counties, one prone to flooding and the other with a lower probability in occurrence of this 
phenomenon, the person who lives in the driest county will regret buying an insurance against the risk of flooding. 
This person, after a year without the occurrence of the insured event will regret concluding this type of insurance 
and will avoid buying another one not to experience the feeling of regret again. 
On the other hand, the person who lives in the county exposed to flood and who did not buy insurance against 
this risk, will regret it after the appearance of the event considered  the flooding of the house. 
To reduce this feeling of regret, insurance companies include two or more events in the risk category covered by 
certain policies (e.g. risk of flood, earthquake and fire included in the house insuring policies) obtaining the 
territorial dispersion of risks endurance. The impact on individual decisions depends on the probability of events 
that leads to regret and the size of loss due to wrong decision. 
Loewenstein and Romer (2000) take into account the emotions caused by love, fear and anxiety that are playing 
an important role in people's decision to buy insurance. A series of experiments conducted by Hsse and Kunreuther 
(2000) examined whether the attachment of a person to an object like a vase, painting or other object affects the 
premium that the person is willing to pay for insurance and the length of time acceptable to receive compensation if 
the item was damaged or destroyed. The result was that people are willing to pay considerably more and wait a 
longer period of time to the collection of the compensation for the exact item when they were informed that they just 
loved it compared with the situation in which they were told they had no special feeling for it.  
Similarly, some people may pay more for insurance if they are afraid of an specific event (stealing a car or a 
painting, house damages caused due to a natural disaster) than if they are not worried about its appearance.  
Experimental studies conducted by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) and Sunstein (2003) indicate that people focus 
more on the negative aspects of the outcome of an event than the probability of its occurrence when they have a 
strong emotional involvement. Emotional involvement may be due to past events (such as natural disasters) or 
attachment against the property insured. 
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2.6. Information Availability  
Before buying an insurance, each person makes a costs survey related to it. There are costs related to obtaining 
the information about the elements of insurance (insured risks, exclusions, sum assured, premium, period of time, 
method of compensation, franchises, etc.) that may even determine a person to give up buying it. 
Overestimation of insurance premium and the existence of high costs (money and resources-especially time) 
related to gathering information from one or more insurers will inevitably lead to giving up insurance especially if 
the person underestimates the probability of occurrence of the insured event. 
One way to reduce the cost of obtaining information is using cheap and fast sources (Internet, online insurance 
brokers) or getting information from people close to us (friends, neighbors, colleagues). Many times a person hears 
about a particular product from the informal conversations he has with his relatives. Also, especially in Romania, 
this information is considered to be more reliable and has a greater impact than those promoted by the media or 
insurance agents. 
The following example is conclusive on this point: in a survey conducted in an area with frequent earthquakes, a 
homeowner responds that he has no insurance against earthquake damage because he does not need one. A friend of 
his who hears the answer cannot resist saying that he has had such insurance for several years and it is accessible in 
terms of costs. The first owner is amazed and asks his friend about the cost of such insurance. After hearing that the 
premium is acceptable he indicates that he will make an insurance against earthquake. 
This example illustrates the situation in which a person becomes interested in buying an insurance because he 
hears (at no cost) that the premium is considered reasonable, even if no figure is given. Another factor that will 
influence the decision is the discovery that one of his neighbors has such an insurance. At a more general level, a 
factor that can influence the consumer's decision are the social norms (Sunstein, 1996). 
 
2.7. Social Norms 
According to the conventional economic theory, the fact that people live in society and communities should not 
influence their decisions and preferences. Instead it incorporates a variety of influence factors: history, culture, 
religion and social norms. 
Social norms are informal rules followed by all the members of a community. They are known to all the members 
of the community and often followed even if there are no explicit penalties for non-compliance. Violation of such 
rules is not punished by a court, but family and close friends would disapprove this action, reducing the level of 
satisfaction or well-being. A "punishment" even more severe may be the loss of reputation in the community that 
automatically leads to economic consequences. Here are some examples of social norms with economic influence: 
providing tips for certain services, charitable donations, the level of trust among members of society. 
Viviana Zelizer, in a study conducted in 1978 on life insurance and death in the nineteenth century in the United 
States, shows that life insurance as an expression of human life financial evaluation was initially rejected because it 
was considered to be a desecration which transforms the sacred event of death into an economic value. 
 
2.8. Financial Culture and History 
In the conventional economic theory, history has no analytical consequence in the decision making process. Past 
experience is considered that it should have no effect on the current decision-making process. But history refers to a 
series of events and choices from  These experiences and choices contribute to the personal ability 
and willingness to take custom, individual decisions. The social interactions from a person's past influence his 
current choices. For example if a person bought an insurance for home and car in the past and enjoyed their benefits 
even sporadically, it is likely that this person would continue to buy such insurance. 
Culture is not an easy concept to define, especially regarding its financial side. As people's preferences for food, 
art, music are affected by culture, so the preferences for saving, investment, entrepreneurship, insurance will be 
affected by the level of culture. 
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As it has happened in recent years in Romania, insurers through insurance agents are probably in the best position 
to provide the necessary information and to send a feedback to the market regulator about the education degree. In 
this context I appreciate the initiative of the Insurance Supervisory Commission of issuing Order no. 9/2012 that 
regulates the qualifications and training of insurance intermediaries. 
3. Conclusion 
From those shown so far I can easily conclude that people decisions in general, and insurance decisions in 
particular are subject to the influence of many factors: risk perception influence, lack of information or submission 
of false information, biases and patterns behavior,  leading to a behavior that is not always rational. 
Given the foregoing, each actor involved in the insurance market can help to its healthy development: state, 
regulatory entities, educational institutions, insurance companies, insurance brokers, insurance agents and insured 
persons. 
The state, by legislation, should influence social norms so that certain insurance to become a habit in the 
community. I refer mainly to domestic insurance against natural disasters where, in case of the occurrence of an 
event, the state is seen as the savior of last resort. Creating a habit for insurance, even with social incentives, could 
save more money allocated from the state budget to remove the effects of disasters. Even though the first steps were 
made by setting PAID and PAD policies, I consider that maintaining a control on this kind of policies it would be 
useful until the acceptance of it as a social norm. 
The same idea can fit both the private pension system and health insurance. Regulatory entities are perhaps in the 
best position to observe certain trends of market players which benefit from misperceptions of risk or influencing 
this perception, from certain insurance products whose prices would be unfair regarding the cover offered. 
Another mission of regulatory bodies would be an increase in educational level of the population and an 
observation of its evolution through insurance agents. I think that the first steps were made by setting a higher level 
of training requested from insurance agents. 
Insurance companies may cover this influence into new products or modifying existing ones: 
 reducing insurance premiums proportional to some measu
manage) that people take in order to reduce the probability of covered risk occurrence; 
 accumulating a percentage of the premium paid and  returning it to the policyholder at the end of the contract if 
the insured risk did not occurred, or transform it into a premium paid in advance for another contract; 
 introduction of vehicle insurance such as "pay as you drive" where the insurance premium is calculated based on 
the number of kilometers driven, hours of operation, people perceiving that they "control" the amounts paid. 
Regarding the insured persons I believe that a greater desire to know, to obtain information from authorized 
sources and awareness of risk perception would provide better management on insurance amounts paid. 
I consider this paper as one of the foundation of general parts and future developments can be performed for each 
type of insurance. Personally I would be interested in developing behavioral aspects of insurance related to human 
life: death insurance, private pension system, health insurance, without being a restricted list. 
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